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THE CHANGING NATURE OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY UNDER
SECTION 1983
STEVEN GOODE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cries that the Burger Court is unsympathetic to civil rights have
been plentiful.' Certainly, much evidence is available to prove that
these cries are not hollow.' Nevertheless, the Burger Court has taken
some significant steps in the direction of facilitating civil rights litiga-
tion. None is more dramatic than the changes wrought in the law
regarding the liability of local governmental entities in suits brought
pursuant to Section 1983.1 Less than five years ago, a plaintiff seek-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School; B.A., Williams
College, 1972; J.D. Yale University, 1975.
1, See, e.g., Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Fed-
eral Courts Out of the Business of Protecting Federal Rights, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 841
(1977); Neuborne, The Procedural Assault on the Warren Legacy: A Study of Repeal
by Indirection, 5 HoFSTRA L. REv. 545 (1977); Note, Section 1983 and Federalisnm
The Burger Court's New Direction, 28 FLA. L. REV. 904 (1976); Comment, CivilRights
in the Burger Court Era, 10 AKRON L. Rnv. 327 (1976).
2. Court decisions concerning standing, abstention, the availability of habeas
corpus relief, the nature of the interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Eleventh Amendment and the exercise of equitable relief amply support the view that
the Court has been less than receptive to civil rights claims. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims,
442 U.S. 415 (1979) (abstention); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (Eleventh
Amendment); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (habeas corpus); Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976) (interests constitutionally protected); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362 (1976) (limits on equitable relief); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (Eleventh Amendment); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971) (abstention).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
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ing compensation for infringement of his constitutional rights by a
local government official was almost invariably restricted to suing the
official. Suit against the entity itself could proceed only on the basis
of a little-used legal theory.4 Now, however, governmental units find
themselves exposed to liability under Section 1983 when they violate
an individual's constitutional rights. In addition, violations of purely
statutory rights not traditionally viewed as civil rights also give rise to
governmental liability, both for the injury caused and for attorney's
fees. Once nearly invincible to suit, governmental entities are now
quite vulnerable.
This turnabout is the result of a series of Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the phrase "and laws" and reinterpreting the word "per-
son" in Section 1983;1 construing the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976;6 and delineating the degree of immunity from
suit which governments and various governmental officials enjoy.
This Article will discuss the new rules of governmental liability cre-
ated by these decisions and their implications for future litigation.
Although the rules of the litigation game have clearly been substan-
tially altered, the contours of the change may be less drastic than
some have feared.
At the outset, note two important caveats. First, most of the deci-
sions discussed in this Article involve questions of statutory construc-
tion. The Reagan administration, with the Republican-controlled
Senate, may well seek to overrule or modify legislatively some or all
of the decisions.7 Second, it is important to distinguish between suits
4. Some plaintiffs were able to bring suit against local governmental entities by
alleging a cause of action directly under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Tur-
pin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978) (en bane), vacated and remanded sub non).
Turpin v. City of West Haven, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); Stapp v. Avoyelles Parish School
Board, 545 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1977); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.
1976). See generally Hundt, Suing Mfunicialities Directly Under the Fourteenth
4mendment, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 770 (1975).
5. Section 1983 reads in relevant part:
Everyperson who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes
to be subjected, any. . . person. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution andlaws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
7. There may be limits as to how far Congress could go in overruling some of
these decisions. For example, were Congress to amend Section 1983 in a way that
would render it ineffective, courts might well allow plaintiffs to proceed with their
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brought in federal court and those brought in state court when the
state is the defendant. The Eleventh Amendment immunizes states
from suits for retroactive relief such as damages or back pay, but only
when the suit is brought in federal court.' Although Congress can
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity,9 it did not do so
when it passed what is now Section 1983.1' Because civil rights liti-
gants generally view federal courts as more sympathetic to their
claims than are state courts, t the protection afforded states by the
Eleventh Amendment is quite significant. The Eleventh Amend-
ment, however, does not immunize local governmental units, regard-
less of where suit is filed. 12
constitutional claims directly under the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (allowing action to proceed directly under Eighth Amend-
ment despite availability of Federal Tort Claim Act action). See also cases cited at
note 4 supra.
8. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Eleventh Amendment is con-
cerned with the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary.
9. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) ("Congress may, in determining what
is *appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials.").
10. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). The majority in Quern recognizes that
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 ceded to the federal government many important powers
which had previously belonged exclusively to the states. The Court declared, how-
ever, that neither logic, circumstances surrounding enactment, nor the legislative his-
tory "warrant ... the conclusion that Congress intended by the general language of
the Act to overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States."
Id. at 342.
11. See generally Neuborne, The Myth ofParity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977);
but see Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1977).
12. For convenience, the terms local governmental units, local governmental enti-
ties, and municipalities are used interchangeably throughout this Article. Although
not all local governmental entities are municipalities, they generally tend to be treated
more like municipalities than states for purposes of Section 1983. The question does
sometimes arise, however, as to whether a particular governmental unit should be
considered an arm of the state and therefore be accorded protection under the Elev-
enth Amendment. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (bi-state authority not immunized by Eleventh Amend-
ment); Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (local
school board not immunized). See also Charles Simkin & Sons, Inc. v. State Univer-
sity Construction Fund, 352 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'dmemn, 486 F.2d 1393
(2d Cir. 1973) (New York Dormitory Authority not immunized, but State University
Construction Authority immunized).
1981]
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II. LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL AND OFFICIAL IMMUNITIES UNDER
SECTION 1983
A. Monroe v. Pape and Governmental Immunity
The starting point for an examination of governmental immunity
in Section 1983 actions must be the landmark decision in Monroe v.
Pape.'3 Although the Court there paved the way for a greatly ex-
panded use of Section 1983,1 AMonroe v. Pape did construe the statute
restrictively in one respect. Section 1983 provides a cause of action
against any "person" who, under color of state law, deprives an indi-
vidual of any right secured by the Constitution and laws. An exami-
nation of the legislative history, however, convinced the Court that
Congress did not intend that municipalities be considered "persons."
Thus, municipalities were immunized from liability under Section
1983.15
Several consequences stemmed from this ruling. When Section
1983 plaintiffs sought only injunctive or declaratory relief, the hold-
ing caused some inconvenience but proved of little practical signifi-
cance. 6 Rather than naming the local entity as defendant, plaintiffs
simply resorted to suing the appropriate officials in their official ca-
pacities. Plaintiffs could then obtain full relief against them.
13. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
14. The Court held that state remedies need not be exhausted before suit could be
filed under Section 1983. Id. at 183. In addition, the Court held that the "under color
of law" requirement was met so long as the challenged conduct resulted from the
misuse of power made possible by the wrongdoer's being clothed with the authority of
state law. Id. at 184. The number of civil rights cases filed in federal court has
skyrocketed, from 296 in 1961 to 12,944 in 1980. [1961] DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 238 Table C-2; [1980]
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT ANN.
REp. 245 (Table 28).
15. The Court based its decision primarily on the House of Representatives' rejec-
tion of the Sherman Amendment which would have created municipal liability for
damages to any citizen deprived of constitutional rights by acts of violence. 365 U.S.
at 188-89. It also relied on congressional expressions of doubt as to the amendment's
constitutionality, id. at 190, and the antagonistic response of the Congress to the
amendment. Id. at 191.
16. Some lower courts allowed suits for injunctive relief against the governmental
entity directly, finding Monroe applicable only to suits for damages. See, e.g., Dailey
v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School
Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971). The Supreme
Court obliterated this distinction in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973),
holding that municipalities were not subject to suits for equitable relief under Section
1983.
[Vol. 22:71
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When plaintiffs sought monetary relief, however, complications
arose. If an entity such as a local school board was the named de-
fendant, courts had to engage in the almost metaphysical task of de-
ciding whether the particular entity was a "person." 7 That question
usually produced a negative answer.' 8 If, instead, the suit named a
government official, courts examined the source which would actu-
ally pay any recovery. When it appeared that a judgment would
come out of the entity's treasury rather than the official's own pocket,
courts held that the action would not lie under Section 1983. A plain-
tiff could not name the official as defendant when the real party in
interest was the governmental entity, a "non-person."' 9 On the other
hand, if recovery were actually to come out of the official's pocket,
the barrier of official immunity confronted the plaintiff.
B. Official Immunity
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has sought to provide gov-
ernment officials with some protection from the threat that their offi-
cial actions might subject them to personal liability. Passage of
Section 1983 did not, the Court held in Tenney v. Brandhove,0 abol-
ish the common law immunity from suit enjoyed by state legislators.
Absolute immunity to suit under Section 1983 was also extended to
judges2' and prosecutors as well.22 The primary justification given
for such absolute immunity is that it is necessary to insure independ-
17. Compare Wright v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 501 F.2d 25 (8th Cir. 1974)
(corporation administering state athletic program a "person") and Aurora Educ.
Ass'n East v. Board of Educ., 490 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 985
(1974) (school board is a "person") with Garrett v. City of Hamtrack, 503 F.2d 1236
(6th Cir. 1974) (city planning commission not a "person"); and Singleton v. Vance
County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1974) (school board not a "person"). See
also cases cited in N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, EMERSON, HABER &
DoRSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1540-41 (4th ed.
1976).
18. Developments in the Law - Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv.
1133, 1194 (1977). See also cases cited at note 17 supra.
19. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd,
436 U.S. 658 (1978); Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976),
vacated and remanded, 438 U.S. 901 (1978).
20. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
21. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349 (1978). Whether judges are also immune from suits for injunctive or declaratory
relief has not been resolved, although the Court recently hinted that they would not
be accorded such immunity. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719,735-36 nn. 13 & 14 (1980). In that case, the defend-
1981]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
ent decisionmaking, unaffected by the spectre of personal liability.23
As one court of appeals colorfully put it, "[e]ven though there may be
an occasional diabolical or venal judicial act, the independence of the
judiciary must not be sacrificed one miscroscopic portion of a milli-
meter, lest the fears of Section 1983 intrusions cow the judge from his
duty."'24 Thus, no matter how maliciously a judge acts toward a de-
fendant, or how deliberately a prosecutor presents perjured testi-
mony, he is immune from suit under Section 1983.25
Claims by other officials that they need similar protection from
Section 1983 liability have met with less sympathy. Responding to
such claims by police officers,26 state executive officials,27 school
board members,28 hospital administrators,29 prison officials, 30 and
federal executives,31 the Court has evolved a qualified immunity test.
The test consists of both a subjective and an objective element. Even
if an official's action causes the deprivation of an individual's consti-
tutional rights, the official will be immune from personal liability if
two conditions are met: (a) he did not act with malicious intent to
deprive the individual of a constitutional right or cause other in-
jury-the subjective element; and (b) he did not know or could not
reasonably have been expected to know that the action would violate
ant judge was held liable in a suit for injunctive and declaratory relief for actions
taken in his enforcement capacity. Id.
22. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
23. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 497 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 355-56 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 426 (1976).
24. McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1972).
25. Although labeled "absolute," the immunity enjoyed by judges and prosecu-
tors has some limits. Judges may be held liable for non-judicial acts or actions taken
in the clear absence of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980) (judge acting as prosecutor not
immune); Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072
(1979) (affirming $140,000 damage award against judge who caused coffee vendor to
be arrested and then berated him). Prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for
acts taken outside the scope of their prosecutorial function. See, e.g., Jacobson v.
Rose, 592 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 442 U.S. 930 (1977) (prosecutor join-
ing with sheriff in implementing wiretap not entitled to absolute immunity).
26. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
27. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
28. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
29. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
30. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
31. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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a constitutional right clearly established at the time of the action-the
objective element.32
The Supreme Court has viewed this qualified immunity as striking
the appropriate balance between the individual's right to compensa-
tion (for constitutional injury) and the need to protect the decision-
making processes of state and local officials.33 As a practical matter,
the qualified immunity enjoyed by these officials has proved a signifi-
cant obstacle to civil rights litigants. In numerous cases, defendant
officials have avoided liability for unconstitutional actions because of
their qualified immunity.34
Still other factors militate against the successful prosecution of a
civil rights damage action against government officials. In some in-
stances, plaintiffs will encounter great difficulty in identifying the
particular official responsible for the injury.35 Even when the respon-
sible official is identified, juries are often reluctant to find him liable
for substantial damages.36 Finally, even when substantial damages
are awarded, the official may be judgment proof or without sufficient
assets to satisfy the damage award.37
32. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978). The volume of scholarly
commentary on the issue of official immunity is enormous. See, e.g., Bermann, Inte-
grating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1175 (1977);
Freed, Executive Official Immunityfor Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a
Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 526 (1977); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1209-17 (1977).
33. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 503 (1978).
34. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Turner v. Raynes, 611
F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 269 (1980); Rowe v. State of Tenn., 609
F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1979); Dominguez v. Beame, 603 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980); Walker v. Hoffman, 583 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1127 (1979).
35. See, e.g., Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 964 (1975) (jury verdict for defendant police officers upheld in part because
plaintiffs failed to establish which officers had fired the allegedly fatal and wounding
shots); Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972) (directed verdict for defendant
police officers upheld because plaintiff failed to prove defendants were the officers
who brutally beat him).
36. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983
Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 456-57 (1978).
See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
421-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Donoghue v. Behler, 429 F. Supp. 403, 406
(D.N.J. 1977). See also Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitu-
tional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REv. 922, 923 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Dam-
age Remedies].
37. Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil
1981]
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In sum, until recently civil rights litigants confronted serious diffi-
culties in bringing damage claims under Section 1983. Municipal im-
munity under Section 1983 forced litigants to proceed against the
responsible government officials. Actions against government offi-
cials, in turn, required plaintiffs to surmount the problems presented
by official immunity, juror sympathy, lack of a "deep pocket," and in
some instances, the need to identify the responsible official. With the
Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services,38 the out-
look for civil rights plaintiffs began to improve.
C. The End of Municigal Immunity
In Monell, plaintiffs charged that New York City, its Department
of Social Services and Board of Education, and certain named city
officials 39 unconstitutionally compelled them to take maternity leaves
before such leaves were medically required. They sought back pay
which, the district court found, would ultimately have come from the
city treasury.40 Because the suit was, therefore, really directed solely
against the defendant governmental entities, none of which was a
"person," the district court dismissed it.4 I The court of appeals af-
firmed the dismissal.42 The Supreme Court reversed, overruling its
holding in Monroe v. Pape that municipalities are not "persons"
within the meaning of Section 1983. 43 Writing for the Court, Justice
Brennan reviewed extensively the legislative history surrounding the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and concluded that Congress
had intended to include municipalities within the ambit of the Act.44
Ri'ghts,4a, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 136-37 (1972). See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d
197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966); Note, Damage Remedies, supra note 36, at 923.
38. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
39. The Mayor, Commissioner of the Department of Social Services, and Chan-
cellor of the Board of Education were sued solely in their official capacities. Id. at
661.
40. 394 F. Sup. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
41. Id. at 855.
42. 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976).
43. 436 U.S. at 663.
44. The Court in Mfonell found fault in the inference drawn in Monroe from Con-
gress' rejection of the Sherman amendment. See note 15 supra. In Monell, Justice
Brennan demonstrated that congressional rejection of the Sherman amendment by no
means signified a rejection of all municipal liability. 436 U.S. at 679-83. Monell also
sets forth positive evidence of congressional intent to include municipalities within
the reach of Section 1983. Id. at 683-90.
(Vol. 22:71
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With the decision that governmental entities were thus subject to suit
under Section 1983, there quickly arose the question of the extent to
which entities should be accorded immunity from actions for dam-
ages. The Court in Monell deferred a decision on that question, save
for announcing the logical corollary of its major holding. Govern-
mental entities were not to be accorded absolute immunity, lest the
decision that they were "subject to suit under Section 1983 'be
drained of meaning.' ,4
Decision regarding the proper scope of municipal immunity was
not long deferred. In April 1972, the Chief of Police of Indepen-
dence, Missouri was fired, amidst public accusations which, the court
of appeals later found, blackened his name and reputation.4 6 Ap-
proximately two months after the firing, the Supreme Court in Board
of Regents v. Roth47 held for the first time that a public employee
allegedly stigmatized in the course of his discharge was entitled to a
name-clearing hearing.4" Thus, although the police chief had been
deprived of a constitutional right, it was a right not clearly estab-
lished at the time of the deprivation. The officials named as defend-
ants in the former police chief s damage action were, therefore,
immune from liability.49 The court of appeals held that the City of
Independence was immune as well.50 In Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, a sharply divided Supreme Court reversed.5'1
Justice Brennan again wrote for the majority. His analysis pro-
ceeded on two lines. First, he conducted an historical inquiry, exam-
ining the status of common law immunity for municipalities at the
time the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was passed and how Congress in-
tended to affect that status.52 Second, he analyzed the policy implica-
tions of conferring a qualified immunity upon municipalities.53
45. Id. at 701.
46. Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F..2d 925, 937 (8th Cir. 1977), remanded
for consideration in light of Monell, 438 U.S. 902 (1978), aft'd, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir.
1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
47. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
48. Id. at 573.
49. The individual defendants were found to have met the subjective part of the
qualified immunity defense as well. 421 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
50. 589 F.2d 335, 338 (8th Cir. 1979).
51. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
52. Id. at 638-50.
53. Id. at 650-57.
1981]
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Looking at the common law, Justice Brennan reviewed two 19th
century doctrines that provided municipalities with some protection
from liability. The first was the distinction drawn between a munici-
pality's governmental functions, for which it enjoyed immunity, and
its proprietary functions, for which it did not. 4 The second line of
distinction was drawn between discretionary and ministerial activi-
ties.55 Immunity was available for the former only. Justice Brennan
found, however, that despite these common law immunities, munici-
palities were often held liable for both governmental and discretion-
ary activities. 6 Any immunity that existed for governmental
activities, the Court further noted, was derived from the principle of
sovereign immunity and Congress had abolished "whatever vestige"
of sovereign immunity the municipalities enjoyed by including them
within the purview of Section 1983.17 Any immunity enjoyed at com-
mon law for discretionary activities also provided an inadequate
foundation for a qualified immunity since municipalities have no dis-
cretion to violate the Constitution. 8
Thus, in the majority's eyes, no common law immunity for munici-
palities was well established at the time Section 1983 was enacted.
The failure of Congress to abolish municipal immunity explicitly was
not, therefore, indicative of an intent to allow municipalities to claim
a qualified immunity. 9 Indeed, the fact that Congress intended Sec-
tion 1983 to provide a "broad remedy for violations of federally pro-
tected civil rights"6 evidenced a contrary legislative design.
The Court also found support for its holding in public policy and
the goals of Section 1983. Damage actions, said the Court, are a vital
part of any scheme for vindicating constitutional rights, as they pro-
vide redress to victims of governmental misconduct.6" In addition,
they serve to deter future constitutional violations. When an entity
knows that its actions may subject it to liability, it will strive to mini-
mize the likelihood of unconstitutional behavior.62 In light of the
54. Id. at 644-47.
55. Id. at 648-49.
56. Id. at 646-49.
57. Id. at 647-48.
58. Id. at 649.
59. Id. at 638.
60. Id. at 650.
61. Id. at 651.
62. Id. at 651-52.
[Vol. 22:71
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immunity afforded government officials, the extension of a qualified
immunity to municipalities would militate against fulfillment of the
twin goals of vindicating constitutional rights and detering future vi-
olations. Therefore, qualified immunity should be accorded munici-
palities only if strong countervailing considerations are present.63
The considerations traditionally cited as supporting a qualified im-
munity for officials were, however, deemed by the majority to be less
compelling when applied to municipalities. First, the Court per-
ceived no injustice in holding governmental entities liable for the in-
juries they inflict. To the contrary, modern notions of cost allocation
hold that it is fairer to require the taxpayers to bear the cost of gov-
ernment rather than only burden the injured individual.64 Second,
although the threat ofpersonal liability might inhibit an official in the
execution of his responsibilities, little or no such effect will occur
when it is the governmental entity that will bear liability.65
Justice Powell's dissent disputed almost every point in the majority
opinion.66 He found in 19th century common law a "substantial tort
immunity" for municipal actions.67 In addition, the dissent rejected
as implausible an interpretation of Section 1983 under which con-
gressional silence signified acceptance of the immunity of officials but
abrogated the immunity of municipalities.68
Of apparently even greater significance was the fear that the
Court's decision would convert local governance "into a hazardous
slalom through constitutional obstacles that often are unknown and
63. Id. at 651.
64. Id. at 654, 657.
65, Id. at 656. A third rationale, the fear that the threat of personal liability might
deter individuals from serving in public office, was found irrelevant to the issue of
municipal liability. Id. at 654 n.38.
66. Joining Justice Powell in dissent were the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist. In addition to differing with the majority over its immunity analysis,
the dissent argued that plaintiff had not suffered any constitutional injury. Id. at 658-
64.
67. Id. at 676. Justice Powell noted that the majority relied on Thayer v. Boston,
36 Mass. 511 (1837), as its principal authority. He believed that reliance was mis-
placed due to several later Massachusetts decisions which limited Thayer. In particu-
lar, Justice Powell cited Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344 (1877), which repudiated
Thayer and limited municipal liability to acts performed in the municipality's propri-
etary interest. See note 65 and accompanying text supra. With Thayer so limited,
Justice Powell saw little support for the majority's views of the common law.
68. Id. at 667.
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unknowable."6 9 Officials, knowing that their employer will be held
strictly liable when their actions are later judged to be unconstitu-
tional, will be intimidated in their decisionmaking just as if they were
to be held personally liable for their official actions.70 Furthermore,
Justice Powell argued, fairness dictates a qualified immunity for mu-
nicipalities. Liability should not attach when entities act in good
faith, only to subsequently have their conduct deemed unconstitu-
tional.7 Finally, given the reality of municipal finance, substantial
unanticipated judgments could prove ruinous to many
municipalities.72
A detailed analysis of the two opinions is beyond the scope of this
Article.73 A few brief points should be made, however, for neither
opinion is without its weaknesses. For example, when explaining
why common law sovereign immunity cannot serve as the basis for a
Section 1983 qualified immunity, Justice Brennan resorts to Ose
dixit.74 A sovereign may enact a statute which renders a municipal-
ity amenable to suit, thus abrogating the sovereign immunity. Con-
gress, by enacting Section 1983, abrogated any immunity enjoyed by
municipalities.75 Yet that was precisely the question before the
Court-to what extent did Congress intend to abolish municipal
immunity?
The majority opinion is internally inconsistent as well. On the one
hand, the opinion asserts that the threat of municipal liability, unlike
the threat of personal liability, will not inhibit effective and fearless
decisionmaking.76 On the other hand, the Court claims that the
threat of municipal liability will encourage officials to err on the side
of protecting constitutional rights and to implement rules and proce-
dures designed to minimize the likelihood of future constitutional in-
fractions.' Thus the Court tries to have its cake and eat it too,
69. Id. at 665.
70. Id. at 668-69.
71. Id. at 669.
72. Id. at 670.
73. For a more detailed analysis, see Levinson, Suing Political Subdivisions in Fed-
eral Court: From Edelman to Owen, 11 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 829, 846-63 (1980).
74. This Latin phrase refers to a bare assertion resting on the authority of an
individual.
75. 445 U.S. at 647-48.
76. Id. at 655-56.
77. Id. at 651-52. The dissent chides Justice Brennan for this inconsistency. Id. at
669 n.9.
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claiming that the threat of strict municipal liability will not affect offi-
cials' decisionmaking processes, while also contending that the effect
on the decisionmaking processes will be beneficial.
Whether the effect of decisionmaking will be as great as the dissent
contends is, however, highly debatable. For many public officials,
the threat of personal liability is likely to be of significantly greater
concern than is the threat of municipal liability. The "governmental
paralysis" predicted by the dissent has certainly not been evident in
the year since Owen was decided.78 More important, however, is Jus-
tice Powell's failure to address the majority's point that officials
should consider the constitutionality of contemplated actions. Pro-
viding an incentive to err on the side of protecting constitutional
rights may, after all, be good policy. Finally, the dissent's apprehen-
sion that local governments may be unable to withstand substantial
unanticipated judgments rings hollow. Given the glacial pace of civil
litigation today, it will be rare indeed that a municipality fails to an-
ticipate a substantial judgment well in advance of its occurrence.7 9
Although Owen will never stand as a model of judicial craftsman-
ship, it is nonetheless significant, because it greatly furthered the
transformation of municipal liability started in Monell only two years
earlier. Owen, however, was only the first of two Supreme Court de-
cisions last term that expanded governmental liability under Section
1983.
III. LIABILITY FOR NON-CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
A. The Meaning of "'And Laws"
That Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional vio-
lations has long been clear. Less certain, however, has been whether
claims for the invasion of statutorily-created rights come within its
78. Id. at 669.
79. As an example of the adverse effects the Court's decision will have on
municipal fiscs, Justice Powell noted, id. at 670 n.l 1, an Alaskan case in which a jury
awarded nearly $500,000 to a policeman accused of racism and brutality and removed
from duty without notice or an opportunity to be heard. Wayson v. City of Fair-
banks, No. 77-1581 (Alas. Fourth Dist. Super. Ct., Jan. 24, 1979), reported in 22
ATLA L. Rptr. 222 (June 1979). The case, however, hardly supports his position.
The accusations leveled against the officer were admittedly false, and punitive action
was taken against him by the City Manager against the advice of counsel. Thus, even
if the City had been accorded qualified immunity, it would have been found liable.
Furthermore, punitive damages against the City Manager accounted for $200,000 of
the award.
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ambit. Although the statutory language seemed straightforward
enough-it mentions deprivations of "any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws" ° - the convoluted
legislative history of Section 1983 clouded the issue.8' More than a
century passed without definitive resolution of the question. 2 Fi-
nally, last Term, the Court provided its answer, in Maine v.
Thiboutot.
8 3
The plaintiffs in Thiboutot were welfare recipients, collecting bene-
fits under the federal-state AFDC program. 4 They claimed that the
Maine Department of Human Services was not paying them benefits
to which they were entitled under the governing federal law, Title IV-
A of the Social Security Act.8 5 Alleging that they had been deprived
of a right secured to them by a federal statute, they argued that Sec-
tion 1983 provided a cause of action. 6 The Maine courts agreed and
awarded them injunctive relief and retroactive payment of the correct
benefits.8 7
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
81. When originally enacted, as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Section 1983
provided a cause of action for constitutional violations only. "And laws" was added
three years later as part of an effort to consolidate all the federal laws. The Civil
Rights Act of 1871 also contained a jurisdictional provision, granting jurisdiction to
the district and circuit courts. In the 1874 revision, the jurisdictional portion of the
Act was split, conferring jurisdiction upon the district courts over actions brought to
redress violations of rights secured "by the Constitution of the United States, or...
by any law of the United States," REVISED STATS. § 563(12). In contrast, the grant of
circuit court jurisdiction referred to rights secured "by the Constitution of the United
States or ... by any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the United States."
REVISED STATS. § 629(16). In 1911, Congress abolished circuit courts, transferring
their authority to the district courts. In so doing, however, Congress retained the
more limited definition of jurisdiction that had been used to describe the circuit court
jurisdiction. That language is now found in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). See note 91 infra.
For a further discussion of the legislative history of section 1983, see Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
82. Lower courts that considered the issue generally permitted statutory claims to
be pursued via Section 1983. See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV.
75, 226-27 n.36 and cases cited therein. The ability of individuals to proceed directly
under the right-granting statute by means of implied causes of action, see text accom-
panying notes 142-47 infra, also diminished the urgency of obtaining resolution of
this matter.
83. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
84. Id. at 3.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976).
86. 448 U.S. at 2-3.
87. 405 A.2d 230 (Me. 1979).
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Thus the issue was squarely put to the Court. Does a Section 1983
action lie for a non-constitutional claim? By a six to three margin88
the Court held that it does. Once again Justice Brennan penned the
majority opinion, with Justice Powell writing the dissent.
The majority opinion relied upon the plain language of the statute,
upon dicta in several earlier cases,89 and upon the fact that, in a
number of previous cases, the Court had decided claims raised under
the Social Security Act.9" The dissent argued, however, that "and
laws" referred only to equal rights legislation, not to all federal laws.
The legislative history demonstrated, in Justice Powell's view, that
Congress intended Section 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart,
Section 1343(3), 9" to be coincidental in scope. Because the Court had
concluded only a year before that Section 1343(3) encompasses only
those statutory claims arising under laws providing for equal rights, 92
this prior decision required the Court to similarly constrain the reach
of Section 1983.
The dissent also focused on what it considered the unfortunate
ramifications of the Court's holding. No longer would Section 1983
actions be confined to traditional civil rights claims. Henceforth, Sec-
tion 1983 would subject state and local governmental entities and of-
ficials to liability whenever they deprived an individual of a right
secured by any federal law. And, as Justice Powell noted, hundreds
of federal laws may provide such rights:
The States now participate in the enforcement of federal laws
88. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Stewart,
White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice Powell filed the dissenting
opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
89, 448 U.S. at 4-5. The cases suggest that the § 1983 remedy encompasses not
only violations of constitutional law but also violations of federal statutory law. See
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), and Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405
U.S. 538 (1972), which noted that the predecessor of § 1983 was enlarged to provide
protection for rights under federal laws.
90. Id. The majority asserted that Section 1983 was necessarily the basis for suit
mn the cases raising claims under the Social Security Act (SSA) because the Court had
held in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1975), that no private right of action could
be implied under that Act. This is incorrect, as Edelman held only that Congress had
not authorized suit against the states under the SSA in such a manner as to constitute
a waiver of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 674.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976) grants jurisdiction to the district courts in actions
to redress deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution "or by any Act of Con-
gress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States."
92. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 615 (1979).
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governing migrant labor, noxious weeds, historic preservation,
wildlife conservation, anadromous fisheries, scenic trails, and
strip mining. Various statutes authorize federal-state coopera-
tive agreements in most aspects of land management. In addi-
tion, federal grants administered by state and local governments
now are available in virtually every area of public
administration.93
Nor would the list of laws consist only of those involving cooperative
federal-state programs, as many federal rights are created outside the
context of such programs.94
Thiboutot's significance extends beyond the fact that it permits a
Section 1983 cause of action for a wide range of statutory violations.
The types of suits thus permitted may well end up being much more
costly to governmental entities and officials than are traditional Sec-
tion 1983 actions. Most constitutional damage actions involve rela-
tively small sums. Because constitutional rights have no inherent
value,95 an individual whose constitutional rights have been violated
may collect only nominal damages, absent proof of actual harm.96
Such harm, however, is often difficult to establish. Damages may be
much easier to prove in statutory actions where the individual has
been denied a tangible benefit. In addition, suits brought to enforce
rights under cooperative regulatory and grant programs in areas such
as welfare, transportation, housing, and health care will often be in
the form of class actions. Thus, even where individual damages are
small, when aggregated for a class of thousands, large sums of money
may be involved. Finally, the overall cost of the entity may still be
substantial despite a small damage award, due to the Court's second
holding in Thiboutot, which widened the scope of suits for which mu-
nicipalities may be liable for attorney's fees.
B. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
In response to the Supreme Court's decision inAlyeska Ppeline Co.
v. Wilderness Society,97 which instructed courts not to award attor-
93. 448 U.S. at 22-23.
94. Id. at 23.
95. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978).
96. Id. at 254. The Supreme Court recently ruled that punitive damages may not
be awarded against a municipality. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 101 S. Ct.
2748 (1981).
97. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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ney's fees to civil rights litigants absent statutory authorization, Con-
gress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.98
The Act authorizes the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing
party in any action to enforce enumerated civil rights statutes, includ-
ing Section 1983. 9' In Thiboutot, the Court, reviewing briefly the lan-
guage and legislative history of the Act, held that fees are available in
any action brought pursuant to Section 19 83. t°° Thus, if a plaintiff
prevails on a purely statutory, non-civil rights claim, he may be
awarded attorney's fees so long as he has pleaded that claim under
Section 1983."'
The courts' approach to the awarding of attorney's fees has been
generally liberal, in accordance with the Act's legislative history. A
prevailing plaintiff is entitled to fees unless "special circumstances
would render such an award unjust,"' 1 2 while a prevailing defendant
may receive fees only when plaintiff's suit is "frivolous, unreasonable,
or groundless."'0 3 To prevail, a plaintiff need not fully litigate the
issues or obtain a judicial determination that his rights have been
violated. Vindication of his rights through a settlement or consent
judgment is sufficient for a fee award."° Courts may also award fees
when a defendant unilaterally acts to redress a plaintiff's grievance as
a result of the commencement of the litigation.'0 5 In appropriate cir-
cumstances, fees may be awarded for time spent in state administra-
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
99. The Act provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or
proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charg-
ing a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs.
100. 448 U.S. at 9.
101. Where a pendent constitutional claim is involved, a plaintiff may collect at-
torney's fees even when the statutory claim is not brought under Section 1983. Maher
v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132 n.15 (1980). See generally Wolf, Pendent Jurisdiction,
Multi-Claim Litigation, and the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act, 2 W.N.
ENG. L. REV. 193 (1979).
102. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2462 (1980), quoting New-
man v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
103. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
104. Maher v. Gagne, 442 U.S. 122, 129 (1980).
105. Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees
AwardsAct, 80 COL. L. REv. 346, 362 & n.l0 (1980).
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tive proceedings.° 6 The amount of fees awarded is often substantial,
sometimes far outstripping any damage award.' 7 Plaintiffs' lawyers,
therefore, will undoubtedly plead statutory claims under Section
1983 routinely, thereby exposing the governmental defendant to lia-
bility for attorney's fees. '0 The rules regarding governmental liabil-
ity for attorney's fees have thus undergone a radical transformation
in the past five years. Though the award of attorney's fees was once
the exception, it is now the rule.
IV. POSSIBLE LIMITS ON GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
To the local governmental official, the post-Monell, Owen, and
Thiboutot world must indeed look grim. The near-invincibility to
Section 1983 litigation recently enjoyed by governmental entities is
now gone. Still, the extent of the change wrought, while substantial,
should not be overestimated. Limits still exist on municipal liability.
Indeed, much of the litigation in the coming years likely will focus on
establishing and defining such limits. 1 9 The following section ex-
plores theories that have been or may be urged as governmental de-
fendants seek to limit the impact of Monell, Owen and Thiboutot.
A. What Constitutes Official Policy or Custom?
The Monell holding that municipalities were "persons" for pur-
poses of Section 1983 was certainly a blow to local governmental en-
tities. The Monell Court did, however, hold out a bone to
municipalities, for it also ruled that municipal liability could not be
predicated on a respondeat-superior theory. In order for liability to
accrue, said the Court, the unconstitutional action must be one that
"implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated" or amounts to a "gov-
106. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
107. Attorneys for plaintiff Kenneth Donaldson, for example, were recently
awarded approximately $273,000 for their efforts in Donaldson v. O'Connor, which
included a trip to the Supreme Court. 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 909 (1980). In con-
trast, the jury had awarded the plaintiff only $38,500. 422 U.S. 563, 570 (1975).
108. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 24 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
109. The process of establishing and defining the limitations on municipal liabil-
ity continued in two recent Supreme Court decisions. Middlesex County Sewage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers, 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981), states that courts must in-
quire whether a statute is one which created enforceable "rights" under § 1983. In
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981), the Supreme Court
held that a municipality is not liable for punitive damages under § 1983.
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ernmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received for-
mal approval through the body's official decisionmaking
channels."1 o
When a plaintiffs challenge is to the constitutionality of an ordi-
nance or officially adopted policy of the entity, this latter Monell
holding will, of course, provide little solace to the defendant govern-
ment. ' 1 This was, in fact, the type of claim pressed in Monell, where
formal, written policies were involved." 2 When a challenge is raised,
however, to conduct not embodied in a written policy, ordinance,
regulation or officially-adopted decision, the question of municipal
liability becomes much more problematic.
Although Monell rejected vicarious liability for governmental enti-
ties, it did state that liability may be founded on "edicts or acts" that
"may fairly be said to represent official policy"" l3 as well as on gov-
ernmental custom. Already, in numerous cases, courts have had to
decide whether the allegedly unconstitutional conduct of a public
employee should be attributed to his governmental entity." 4 Unfor-
tunately, courts are encountering a great deal of difficulty in estab-
lishing guidelines for resolving this issue. The cases are, by and
large, long on description and short on analysis. Some general trends
are, nevertheless, discernible." 5
In deciding whether a governmental entity should be responsible
for its employee's action, courts frequently scrutinize the employee's
position of authority. When an official at the highest level of author-
ity acts, his actions almost invariably will be viewed as establishing
governmental policy. As one court of appeals commented:
Thus, at least in those areas in which he [the official], alone, is
110. 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
111. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Environment v. City of Chicago Heights, 480
F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (liability premised on ordinance regulating peddling);
Milwaukee Mobilization for Survival v. Milwaukee County Park Commission, 477 F.
Supp. 1210 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (liability premised on county ordinance regulating use of
public parks).
112. 436 U.S. at 713 (Powell, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 694.
114. See cases cited at notes 116-124 infra.
115. For some earlier views on this question see Kramer, Section 1983 Liability:
Selectedissues Two Years After Monell, 12 URBAN LAW. 232 (1980); Scbnapper, Civil
Rights Litigation After MoneU, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 213 (1979); Note, MunicoalLiabil-
itv Under Section 1983: The Meaning of "Policy or Custom," 79 COLUM. L. REV. 304
(1979),
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the final authority or ultimate repository of county power, his
official conduct and decisions must necessarily be considered
those of one 'whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy' for which the county may be held responsible
under Section 1983.16
An official need not, however, function at the highest level of author-
ity in order for his action to be deemed to represent official policy.
The greater the authority and discretion delegated to an official, the
greater the likelihood that the governmental entity will be held re-
sponsible for his actions. For example, a state university vice-presi-
dent's rejection of a gay student group's request to register as a
student organization was held to be actionable against the
university.'17
By the same token, the lower the employee is located on the ladder
of authority, the less likely it is that his action will constitute official
policy. Thus, in Sterling v. Village ofMaywood, "8 the fact that "ordi-
nary employees in the Village Water Department were responsible"
for the decision not to reinstate plaintiff's water service prompted the
Seventh Circuit to dismiss plaintiffs claim against the Village." 9
Even actions taken by low-level employees may, however, result in
governmental liability. A second factor that courts consider is the
frequency with which the act occurs. A "persistent and widespread"
practice, 120 in the absence or even in contravention of formal pol-
116. Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 1980). See also
Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 448 (2d Cir. 1980)
("Surely the mayor is the one city official whose edicts and acts represent municipal
policy. . ."); Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, 588 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1979) ("As
President of the Junior College, Dr. Spencer is surely one 'whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy.' "); Halsworth v. Hatfield, 487 F. Supp. 751,
753 (D. Or. 1980) (Director of Data Processing Authority may be one whose edicts
and acts represent official policy). But see Hoopes v. City of Chester, 473 F. Supp.
1214 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (municipality not liable where mayor allegedly demoted a police
officer because he cooperated with federal authorities in investigation and prosecution
of mayor).
117. Gay Student Services v. Texas A & M Univ., 612 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980).
118. 579 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1978).
119. Id. at 1357.
120. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), quoting
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970). See also Knight v. Carlson,
478 F. Supp. 55, 59 (E.D. Cal. 1979), which distinguishes between the meaning of
"custom" and "usage" under Section 1983. Custom is a "deeply imbeded traditional
way of carrying out. . . policy," while usage is "the regular and repeated response to
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icy,' 2' will be considered a governmental custom for which the entity
will be liable. When an act is frequently repeated or is but a part of a
pattern of conduct, courts reason that it is more probably being per-
formed with the tacit approval of the entity. It is, therefore, reason-
able to hold the entity liable.'22
When it is the isolated act of a lower-level employee that has
caused an injury, neither factor points to governmental liability. In
such instances, therefore, victims have sought to predicate govern-
mental liability on the basis of the entity's failure to act. Many of
these "failure to act" cases arise in the context of police misconduct,
with plaintiffs claiming a failure to adequately train or supervise the
lower-level employees. Courts are, by and large, unreceptive to such
actions, demonstrating a strong reluctance to allow them to reach a
jury.
One technique utilized by some courts to dismiss such cases has
been to place detailed pleading requirements on plaintiffs. 2 3 More
frequently, however, courts have dismissed cases because plaintiffs
fail to allege more than a negligent failure on the part of the entity to
train or supervise. These court have typically required allegations of
deliberate or gross negligence.124 While this result may ultimately be
a situation." Usage may be present without custom, but custom may not exist without
usage.
121. See, e.g., Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449, 453-54 (E.D. Pa.
1979), in which a police officer was dismissed for refusing to answer questions pro-
pounded during an internal police investigation on the ground that they constituted
an invasion of privacy. Although the City Charter provided only that refusals to
answer based on Fifth Amendment rights would result in dismissal, the court found
that it was Police Department policy to dismiss officers who failed to answer any
questions, regardless of the reasons given for the refusal to respond.
122. Cf. Magayanes v. City of Chicago, 496 F. Supp. 812 (N.D. Il. 1980) (isolated
incident, "however reprehensible or true, does not indicate systematic, city-supported
abuses. . ."); Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237, 1246 (D.N.J. 1979) (sin-
gle incident of police brutality insufficient to establish municipal liability). But see
Turpin v. Mallet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 577 (1981).
123. See, e.g., Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130, 1136-37 (D. Conn. 1978)
(requiring particularized fact pleading); Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F. Supp. 722, 728
(N.D. Ohio 1980) (must "identify what training procedure was inadequate and in
what way").
124. See, e.g., Turpin v. Mallet, 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 577 (1981); Reeves v. City of Jackson, 608 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1979); Owens v.
Haas, 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. deniedsub nom. County of Nassau v. Owens,
444 U.S. 980 (1979); Feldman v. City of New York, 493 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Moomey v. City of Holland, 490 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Mayes v. Elrod,
470 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. M1. 1979); Randle v. Gokey, 469 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ohio
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justifiable, the rationales invoked by the courts are seriously flawed.
The rationale most frequently employed is that the Supreme
Court's rejection of respondeat-superior as a basis for liability means
that claims of mere negligence are inadequate. Such an argument is
premised on a misunderstanding of the doctrine of respondeat-supe-
rior. Under traditional tort theory, an employer's own conduct is im-
material to a respondeat-superior claim. An employee's negligence
will be imputed to his employer regardless of whether the employer
has done anything to aid or encourage the employee in his conduct.
In fact, the employer will be liable even if he has done everything in
his power to prevent the conduct. 125 In contrast, an allegation of neg-
ligent failure to train or supervise is directed at the entity itself.' 6
The. claim is that the entity's own negligent conduct caused the al-
leged constitutional violation. Although a plaintiff may ultimately
find it difficult to prove that the inadequacy of the training program
proximately caused his injury, the inapplicability of respondeat-supe-
rior to Section 1983 actions should not bar his claim.
A second rationale used to dismiss this type of claim is that such
failures to act do not constitute official policy.' 27 It is unclear what
this rationale demands of plaintiffs. Police departments generally are
delegated the authority to hire, train and supervise individual of-
ficers. The manner in which a police department chooses to hire,
train and supervise its officers must, therefore, constitute the type of
act which may fairly be said to represent official policy. It is incon-
ceivable, for example, that a police department's refusal to hire or
train women would not be considered official policy.
Other courts find justification for requiring more than mere negli-
gence in Rizzo v. Goode128 and Estelle v. Gamble.129 In Rizzo the
Court held that the granting of injunctive relief against the defendant
supervisory personnel was erroneous because plaintiffs failed to show
1979)); Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585, 591 (D.R.I. 1978); Sirmans v.
City of South Miami, 86 F.R.D. 492 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
125. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971).
126. To be more accurate, the claim is directed at the conduct of those supervisory
officials whose conduct would appropriately be deemed to constitute official policy.
127. See, e.g, Jones v. City of Philadelphia, 491 F. Supp. 284,287 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(claims of gross and reckless negligence in failing to adequately train, supervise and
discipline officers do not constitute allegations of unconstitutional official policy).
128. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
129. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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a causal connection between the various instances of police miscon-
duct and any action by the defendants. 130 Estelle held that a plaintiff
must allege deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical
needs in order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 3'
Taking these decisions together, courts have concluded that proof of
gross negligence or deliberate indifference by a police department in
the training or supervision of its officers is required to establish gov-
ernmental liability when a plaintiff claims a failure to act.1 32 These
cases do not, however, provide adequate justification for this conclu-
sion, either alone or in tandem.
Rizzo did establish, and Monell affirmed, that an entity's right to
control an employee is an insufficient basis for the entity's liability. 3
The Court in Monell made it clear, though, that Rizzo involved "the
mere right to control without any control or direction having been
exercised and without any failure to supervise."'134 Thus Rizzo hardly
governs a case where the plaintiff explicitly alleges a failure to
supervise.
Similarly, the Estelle opinion cannot be controlling where the
claim is not one of cruel and unusual punishment. The Court's deci-
sion in Estelle rested on its opinion that, in the medical context, the
Eighth Amendment reaches only the "unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain."' 35 As the negligent failure to provide adequate medi-
cal care cannot be said to amount to "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain,"' 36 allegations of mere negligence are inadequate
to state a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. The Court, how-
ever, did not hold, either in Rizzo or Estelle, that negligent conduct
may never be the basis for Section 1983 liability. Indeed, late last
130. 423 U.S. at 371.
131. 429 U.S. at 106.
132. See, e.g., Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2d
Cir. 1980) (two fundamental requisites for § 1983 liability, one of which is a showing
of deliberate indifference); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077
(3d Cir. 1976) (required showing of deliberate indifference to deprivation of a pris-
oner's constitutional right to medical attention); Norton v. McKeon, 444 F. Supp. 384
(1977) (negligence in supervision and training of police officers sufficient to state a
§ 1983 cause of action).
133. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378. See Brief for Respondents at 34-35.
134. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978) (em-
phasis added).
135. 429 U.S. at 105.
136. Id.
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Term, the Court recognized that at least some Section 1983 actions
may be predicated on negligence. In Parratt v. Taylor,137 respon-
dent's contention that prison officials had violated his due process
rights by negligently depriving him of property was held to state a
valid due process claim.'13  Thus, Mr. Justice Rehnquist's prior
warning that the question of whether Section 1983 actions may be
based on negligence "may well not be susceptible of a uniform an-
swer across the entire spectrum of conceivable constitutional viola-
tions" 139 was proved true. Courts may be correct in requiring more
than negligence in failure to train and supervise cases. But it is clear
that more than citation to Rizzo and Estelle is needed to justify such a
conclusion. 140
B. Limiting the Reach of Thiboutot
Although Yhiboutot has expanded the scope of governmental lia-
bility by holding that Section 1983 provides a cause of action for
purely statutory claims, several grounds for attempting to limit
Thiboutot's impact are available to defendants.
1. Reviving Implied Cause of Action Analysis
Prior to Thiboutot, individuals were not necessarily barred from
bringing suit for statutory violations. Although many statutes failed
to provide explicitly that an individual litigant could bring suit,
courts often implied the existence of a private cause of action. 14'
Congressional intent was the primary factor that courts were in-
structed by the Supreme Court to consider in determining whether a
137. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
138. Id. at 536-37.
139. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1979).
140. Regardless of the standard ultimately settled upon, most plaintiffs will en-
counter great difficulty in establishing that their injury was caused by a failure to
adequately train or supervise. As one court noted, even the most minimal training
should be sufficient to warn officers against beating individuals. Feldman v. City of
New York, 493 F. Supp. 537, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
141. Texas & P.R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), established the broad propo-
sition that a private right of action may be implied in appropriate circumstances. In
the well-known case of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the Court held
that a stockholder had an implied private cause of action based upon a violation of
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. Cf. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
422 U.S. 560 (1979) (denied implied private right of action based on Section 17(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act).
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cause of action should be implied under a particular statute.142 Be-
cause Congress often failed to state its intent explicitly, the Court, in
Cort v. Ash, identified several other factors as relevant to the in-
quiry.' 44 Although Thiboutot eliminates the need for finding that an
implied cause of action exists when suit is brought pursuant to Sec-
tion 1983,141 courts will still have to consider some of the factors used
in implied cause of action analysis.
a. The Right Requirement
Section 1983 provides a cause of action when an individual has
been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws. Obvi-
ously, in order to show that he has been deprived of a right, an indi-
vidual must first show that the Constitution or statute has secured
that right to him. 4 6 If he cannot do this, his action should fail. How,
then, is one to ascertain whether a particular statute grants a right to
a particular plaintiff? The first factor in the implied cause of action
analysis considered precisely this question. "[Is the plaintiff one 'of
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,' .. that
is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?' 47
142. Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1580
(1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 101 S. Ct. 1451, 1461 (1981); Tran-
samerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979).
143. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
144. The Court listed four factors as relevant to the implied right of action in-
quiry. First, is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose especial benefit the stat-
ute was enacted? Second, courts are to look for any indications of legislative intent on
the issue. Third, would the implication of a cause of action be consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme? Fourth, would it be inappropriate to
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law due to the area being one which
traditionally has been the concern of the states? Id. at 78.
145. 448 U.S. at 4-5. See, e.g., Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 504 F.
Supp. 1292, 1297 n.1 (D. Colo. 1981). In California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287
(1981), suit was brought against state and federal officials and agencies, claiming non-
compliance with Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C. § 403. The Court, using conventional implied cause of action analysis, held
respondents had no right of action to enforce the Act. Id. at 292-98. No mention of
Thiboutot was made, apparently because respondents failed to plead a Section 1983
claim. Nor did respondents allude to Thiboutot in their brief to the Court.
146. Cf. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981) (it
is an open question whether an individual's interest in having the state provide assur-
ances to the federal government of compliance with the underlying statute constitutes
a right secured by § 1983).
147. 422 U.S. at 78. In Cuyler v. Adams, 101 S. Ct. 703 (1981), plaintiff claimed
that he had been transferred from a Pennsylvania prison to New Jersey without being
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Thus an individual will be able to show that a statute has granted
him a right when he is a member of the class that the statute was
intended to aid. In other words, an individual may pursue a Section
1983 action based on a purely statutory claim only when he is able to
satisfy the first factor of the implied cause of action analysis.
b. Exclusive Statutory Enforcement Schemes
Just a year before Thiboutot was decided, the Court handed down
a decision dealing with another statute derived from the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. In Great 4merican Federal Savings and Loan Assn. v.
Novotny,148 plaintiff contended that he was dismissed by the Savings
and Loan after he objected to the discriminatory policies it directed
against female employees. He claimed that the Savings and Loan
and its directors conspired to deprive him of equal rights under the
law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c). 149 The Court held, however,
that plaintiff could not proceed under Section 1985(c).' 50 That sec-
tion, explained the Court, creates no substantive rights. It simply
provides a cause of action to redress conspiratorial violations of
rights created by the Constitution or other statutes.' 5 In Novotny,
the substantive right in issue was created by Title VII, which itself
created a detailed remedial framework. Given Congress' intent that
Title VII would be the exclusive remedy for discrimination claims
such as Novotny's, the Court held that Section 1985(c) could not be
invoked to redress a Title VII violation.' 52
Like Section 1985(c), Section 1983 creates no substantive rights.' 53
It, too, simply provides a remedial device when substantive rights,
created elsewhere, are violated. If Section 1985(c) may not be used
when Congress intended the statute from which the substantive claim
derives to provide the exclusive remedy for violation of its terms, one
afforded the procedural protections provided by the Interstate Agreement on Detain-
ers. After finding that the plaintiff was entitled to the claimed protections, the Court
declared simply that he had stated a claim for relief under Section 1983, citing
Thiboutot. Id. at 712. Thus, prior to citing Thiboutot the Court found that the De-
tainer Agreement created a federal right in plaintiff's favor.
148. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
149. Id. at 369.
150. Id. at 378.
151. Id. at 372.
152. Id. at 378.
153. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979).
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must conclude that a similar restriction must be placed on Section
1983.' 54 Thus, the need to divine congressional intent, the primary
factor in implied cause of action analysis, resurfaces.'55 While this
will provide another means of restricting Thiboutot's reach, its effec-
tiveness in limiting Thiboutot is likely to be lessened for two reasons.
First, the congressional inquiry will be phrased in slightly different
terms in the post-Thiboutot cases than in the implied cause of action
cases. In the latter, courts ask whether Congress intended to create a
private cause of action.' 56 In Section 1983 actions, courts will frame
the question in terms of whether Congress intended the enforcement
scheme established by the underlying statute to be the exclusive
means of enforcement. Sometimes this difference in focus will prove
inconsequential,' 57 but that will not always be the case. By requiring
a finding that Congress intended the statutory enforcement mecha-
nism to be exclusive, Thiboutot in effect shifts the presumption in
favor of allowing plaintiff to proceed. 15 Thus it reverses the Court's
increasing reluctance to allow such suits.'5 9
154. This was recently noted in Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2626-27 (1981). See also Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981); Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
Inc. v. Virginia State Water Control Bd., 501 F. Supp. 821, 826-29 (E.D. Va. 1980);
Yapalater v. Bates, 494 F. Supp. 1349, 1358 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Cf. Preiser v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (Section 1983 not available for challenging fact or duration
of confinement; habeas corpus proceedings are the exclusive remedy). But see Maya
v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 8 B.R. 202, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
155. Another possible way of applying Novotny would be to read it simply as
requiring that a plaintiff exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing his ac-
tion under Section 1983. At that point, he would then have the entire Section 1983
remedial arsenal at his disposal. Such an application of Novotny is improbable, how-
ever, for the plaintiff there had exhausted his administrative remedies, 442 U.S. at
369, and was attempting to use Section 1985(c) to obtain relief not available under
Title VII. Furthermore, to the extent that the non-exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies rule in Section 1983 doctrine is being abandoned, see, e.g., Patsy v. Florida Inter-
national Univ., 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane), this application of Novotny
would be redundant.
156. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979).
157. For example, a major factor in the decision to imply a cause of action in
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), was the majority's belief that
the administrative remedy available to the plaintiff there was not intended to be her
exclusive avenue of redress.
158. The view that Thiboutot creates such a presumption was argued by Justice
White in the recently decided Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 51 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
159. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REv. 75, 279 (1980). Cf. Can-
non v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist J., concurring)
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Second, the implied cause of action cases often inquire as to
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action for a
particular remedy. Courts have generally been more likely to imply a
cause of action for declaratory or injunctive relief than for dam-
ages. 6 ' Section 1983, however, establishes a cause of action both at
law and in equity. An individual seeking redress pursuant to Section
1983 for a statutory violation should, therefore, be equally free to
seek damages as he is to seek injunctive relief.' 6 ' Thus Thiboutol will
result in the availability of damages relief to plaintiffs where they
might previously have been restricted to an injunction. 162
An example may illustrate more concretely the changes brought
about by Thiboutot. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
of 1975 (FERPA)163 requires that any educational agency or institu-
tion receiving federal funds must afford students and parents an op-
portunity to inspect students' own education records and must also
restrict the access of third parties to such records. FERPA does not
state, however, whether students and parents may bring suit to en-
("this Court in the future should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action
absent... specificity on the part of the Legislative Branch"). See also Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
160. Cf. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (im-
plying cause of action for equitable relief under § 215 of the Investment Advisors Act
of 1940, but denying cause of action for damages under § 206 of the Act); Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 40 n.26, 41-42 (1977) (implying a preference for equi-
table over monetary relief). See also Meines v. State of Missouri, 498 F. Supp. 944
(E.D. Mo. 1980) (implying cause of action for injuctive relief, but not for damages,
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School
Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1109-12 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (semble). But see Patton v. Dump-
son, 498 F. Sup. 933, 936-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (implying cause of action for both in-
junctive and monetary relief under § 504); Poole v. South Painfield Bd. of Educ., 490
F. Supp. 948, 949 (D.N.J. 1980) (semble).
161. Thus, in Thiboutot the Court made no inquiry as to the appropriateness of
monetary relief in the context of the Social Security Act. 448 U.S. 1 (1980). The fact
that the Court had allowed plaintiffs in earlier cases to obtain injunctive relief to
enforce their rights under the Act apparently was sufficient to establish that they pos-
sessed rights under the Act and that the administrative scheme erected by Congress
was not intended to be exclusive.
162. Cf. Robinson v. Pratt, 497 F. Supp. 116, 122 (D. Mass 1980) (message of
Thiboutot is that "a plaintiff seeking enforcement of federal rights against a state is
not to be abandoned by federal courts if any reasonable remedy can be fashioned").
But see Penhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1981), in
which the Court suggests in dicta that when the defendant state is found in violation
of federal funding stipulations, the relief available to the plaintiff may be limited to
an injunction against the further payment of federal monies to the state.
163. 20 U.S..C. § 1232g (1976).
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force these rights. It merely provides that the Secretary of Educa-
tion" must designate an office and review board to investigate and
adjudicate violations of the Act and take appropriate enforcement
action.
Thus, if a parent tried to sue a local school board for violating
FERPA, absent Thiboutot, a court would first have to imply a cause
of action in the parent's favor. Because FERPA was a floor amend-
ment to the Educational Amendments of 1974,165 evidence of con-
gressional intent is sparse."' The only legislative history that
discusses enforcement simply paraphrases the statute's charge to the
Secretary of Education. 1  Nor does either the language or structure
of the statute, or the circumstances of its enactment,168. provide gui-
dance as to legislative intent.
Absent evidence of an intent to provide a private cause of action,
the existence of a legislatively mandated enforcement scheme should
lead a court to refuse to imply a cause of action. The Supreme Court
recently cautioned courts to be "chary" of implying a cause of action
where a statute expressly provides a particular remedial scheme.' 69
In the one reported decision concerning this issue under FERPA, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declined to imply a cause of
action.' 7°
Thiboutot, however, impels the opposite result. The court would
first have to consider whether the parent is alleging the deprivation of
a right secured to him by FERPA. Since the parent clearly is a mem-
ber of the class for whose especial benefit FERPA was enacted, this
164. The Act originally placed these responsibilities in the hands of the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare. When the Department of Education was created,
these responsibilities were transferred to the Secretary of Education. Pub. L. No. 96-
88, Title VI, § 601, 93 Stat. 696 (1979).
165. Pub. L. No. 93-380, Title V, § 513(a), 88 Stat. 571 (1974). FERPA was intro-
duced by Senator Buckley on the Senate floor less than two weeks before the bill was
passed by that body. 120 CONG. REC. 13952 (May 9, 1974).
166. The only contemporary legislative history that exists is found in the report of
the Conference Committee, H. Conf. Rpt. 93-1211 at 186, and in statements made on
the floor of the Senate at the time he introduced FERPA. 120 CONG. REc. 13952
(May 9, 1974).
167. H. Conf. Rpt. 93-1211 at 186.
168. The Court has examined these factors on several occasions in an attempt to
divine congressional intent. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
169. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979).
170. Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267, 1277 (8th Cir. 1977).
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requirement would be met. Second, the court would have to decide
whether Congress intended enforcement by the Secretary of Educa-
tion to be the exclusive means of enforcing FERPA. As discussed
above, however, scant evidence exists concerning the congressional
intent behind FERPA. Thus, it will be just as difficult to demonstrate
that Congress intended to establish an exclusive enforcement scheme
as it is to show that Congress intended to provide a private cause of
action. Because Thiboutot places upon defendants the burden of
demonstrating that a private suit should not be allowed, the result
here should be that a private action will lie. The shift from requiring
affirmative evidence of congressional intent to provide a cause of ac-
tion to requiring such evidence of an intent to preclude a cause of
action thus proves crucial.
2. Does "And Laws" Mean All Laws?
On its face, Thiboutot admits of no limits to the meaning of the
phrase "and laws." As the Court there stated, the question before it
was whether that phrase "means what it says, or whether it should be
limited to some subset of laws."'' The Court's answer was seem-
ingly unambiguous. "Given that Congress attached no modifiers to
the phrase," Section 1983 "broadly encompasses statutory as well as
constitutional" claims. 172 The dissent roundly criticized the majority
for bringing within the scope of Section 1983 claims "that have little
or nothing to do" with civil rights. 17 3
Despite the sweeping language and rationale of Thiboutot, at least
one court of appeals has interpreted "and laws" to cover less than all
laws. In First National Bank of Omaha v. Marquette National Bank of
Minneapolis, 17 plaintiffs claimed that defendant violated provisions
of the National Banking Act 175 by lobbying for legislation which
placed an interest ceiling on bank card credit, obtaining such legisla-
tion, and then litigating for its enforcement. This allegedly consti-
tuted a violation of the Act, which preempts the states' power to
regulate the interest of national banks. 176 Plaintiffs brought their ac-
tion pursuant to Section 1983. The Eighth Circuit held, however,
171. 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 25.
174. 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980).
175. 12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86 (1976).
176. 636 F.2d at 197.
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that plaintiffs could not proceed pursuant to Section 1983.'1"
Thiboutot involved the right to receive welfare benefits which, in the
opinion of the panel, constituted an important personal right akin to
the fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.'
7
In contrast, the rights invoked by the plaintiffs in First National were
merely incidental to a purely economic regulatory statute affecting
only commercial institutions.1 79 The qualitative difference in these
rights was thus viewed as justification for distinguishing Thiboutot
and thereby limiting the reach of Section 1983.
Whether other courts will follow and attempt to amplify upon this
limiting principle remains to be seen. Thus far, at least, the Eighth
Circuit seems to be a leader without a following.' This should not
be surprising, since there is little support in Thiboutot for the idea of
distinguishing between types of non-civil rights claims. Nor is the
distinction drawn by the Eighth Circuit particularly convincing, espe-
cially in light of the Supreme Court's holding only a year before that
the statute involved in Thiboutot was not a civil rights act.' 8 ' Fur-
thermore, other rationales were available to the court to deny plain-
tiffs' claim.' 2 Nevertheless, the court's opinion does strike a
sympathetic chord. Using Section 1983 to proceed upon a National
177. Id. at 198.
178. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
179. 636 F.2d at 198-99.
180. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 186 n.5 (3d Cir. 1980); Maya v.
Philadelphia Gas Works, 8 B.R. 202, 204-05 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Chesapeake Bay Foun-
dation, Inc. v. Virginia State Water Control Bd., 501 F. Supp. 821, 825 (E.D. Va.
1980); Yapalater v. Bates, 494 F. Supp. 1349, 1357-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
181. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 411 U.S. 600, 620-23 (1979).
182. At least with respect to defendant's lobbying activity, there appears to be no
action taken under color of state law as is required by Section 1983. Defendant's
litigation efforts to enforce the state law for which it successfully lobbied present a
more complicated question. As was pointed out in Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978), a distinction can be drawn between the "under color of state
law requirement" and the requirement that there be shown a deprivation of a consti-
tutional or statutory right. Some constitutional or statutory rights are protected only
from governmental invasion. In order for there to be an invasion of such rights, state
action must be proved. Other rights, such as those created by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, provide protection against private as well as governmental infringement. Still,
a private person who violates another's Thirteenth Amendment rights must be acting
under color of state law for a Section 1983 action to lie. At a minimum this requires
that the individual act with the knowledge of and pursuant to a state statute. Id. at
156. The defendant in First Nat'l Bank of Omaha was not acting with the knowledge
of or pursuant to a state statute when it engaged in its lobbying and litigating
activities.
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Bank Act claim does seem somewhat far-fetched. If attempts to limit
Section 1983 are not successful via the avenues suggested above,
many courts will undoubtedly be tempted to follow the Eighth Cir-
cuit's lead.
V. EVALUATING THE IMPACT
Without doubt, local government entities stand far more vulnera-
ble to suit now than they were five years ago. They present a consid-
erably more attractive target for the Section 1983 litigant than do
-either government officials or state governments. 183 But the changes
in the law concerning governmental liability, while substantial,
should not be overestimated. Local governmental entities have by no
means been stripped of all protection from suit. Courts have already
begun, and will certainly continue, to develop doctrinal devices to
check the impact of Monell, Owen and Thiboulot.18 4 Moreover, to a
limited extent, local governments were bearing the cost of successful
Section 1983 litigation prior to this trio of cases. Judgments obtained
against local officials quite frequently were paid by the governmental
unit, even in some instances where the official was found to have ac-
ted maliciously."8 5 In addition, as a result of the trend in the lower
courts to allow suits to be brought against municipalities directly
under the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 6 local governmental entities
found themselves named as defendants with increasing frequency.
Indeed, had Monell never been decided, it is likely that bringing suit
183. In fact, some have read the Court's decision in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332
(1978) as holding that states are not "persons" under Section 1983. Id. at 345 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). See also Brown v. Supreme Court, 476 F. Supp. 86, 89 (D. Nev.
1979); Note, Quern v. Jordan: A Misdirected Bar to Section 1983 Suits Against States,
67 CALIF. L. REv. 407 (1979). But see The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 75, 231 n.65 (1980). A better explanation of Quern is that the Court there held
only that the language of Section 1983 is insufficiently explicit to evidence a congres-
sional intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 440 U.S. at 343-
45.
184. See note 109 supra.
185. See Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 811-12
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Project, Suing the Police]; Jaron, The Threat ofPersonal
Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Does It Interfere with the Performance of
State andLocal Government?, 13 URBAN LAW. 1, 17-18 (1981). Most states have stat-
utes providing for indemnification of government officials. See Yudof, Liabilityfor
Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official, 49 S. CAL. L. REv.
1322, 1383-92 (1976).
186. See cases cited at note 4 supra.
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against municipalities directly under the Fourteenth Amendment for
constitutional violations would today be standard operating proce-
dure for civil rights litigants.' 7 Finally, to the extent that a cause of
action could be implied directly under a particular substantive stat-
ute, the effect of Thiboutol is diminished.
Nevertheless, Monell, Owen and Thiboutot each increased the vul-
nerability of local government entities to damage actions. Monell ob-
viated the need to resort to predicating one's cause of action on the
Fourteenth Amendment and rendered municipalities subject to all
Section 1983 actions. 88  Thiboutot removed most of the barriers
posed by an increasingly restrictive implied cause of action doctrine
and, by permitting attorney's fees for statutory, non-civil rights
claims, provided a strong incentive for bringing such suits."8 9 Most
important of all, Owen refused to extend a qualified immunity to mu-
nicipalities. 9 ' Collectively, they have created an atmosphere which
encourages litigants to bring Section 1983 actions against local gov-
ernment entities.
One can only speculate as to the manner in which these develop-
ments will affect municipalities. Procuring insurance against poten-
tial liability is becoming increasingly difficult and costly.' 9' Thus,
most entities will have to shoulder directly the costs of their illegal
actions and the illegal actions of the employees whom they choose to
indemnify. One possibility is that they will begin to withdraw from
those activities that are most likely to subject them to liability. If
such a trend has started, however, it is not yet apparent. Nor are we
likely to witness such a response. Those activities that are most likely
to generate litigation-police protection, zoning decisions, and other
activities directly affecting the citizenry-are activities that are politi-
cally infeasible to halt.
A more realistic possibility is that local governments will lobby
hard for greater local control over the federal funds they receive.
Lessening the number of federal standards that exist lessens the im-
187. Such suits were gaining wider acceptance in the years immediately preceding
Monell. See cases cited at note 4 supra. Had Monell not been decided, more courts
and practitioners would have inevitably become aware of this litigation tactic.
188. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
189. See notes 94 & 100 and accompanying text supra.
190. See notes 57-63 and accompanying text supra.
191. Jaron, supra note 185 at 19. Project, Suing the Police, supra note 185, at 785
n.19.
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pact of Thiboutot. Since the theme of less federal and more local
control is one that is voiced frequently by the Reagan administration,
such efforts may well prove successful.
Whether local governments will measurably change their internal
operations in an attempt to minimize potential liability for infringe-
ments of constitutional and statutory rights, as was suggested by the
majority in Owen,' 92 is impossible to predict. Some attempts at risk
management are being undertaken by some jurisdictions.193 On the
other hand, empirical evidence indicates that the threat of damage
actions, at least in the context of police misconduct suits, generates
only minimal change.' 94
The only safe prediction is that the response of local governments
will likely be uneven. Even within the larger local governmental en-
tities, the response is unlikely to be uniform, with some departments
making efforts to minimize future liability and others doing nothing.
Unlike Justice Powell, I do not foresee governmental paralysis result-
ing from Monell, Owen or Thiboutot. But neither is Justice Brennan's
prediction that otherwise indifferent government officials will become
vigilant in their efforts to protect the rights of citizens likely to prove
true. Changes more fundamental than those worked by the three de-
cisions would be required to accomplish such a result.
192. 442 U.S. 622, 652 (1980).
193. See Jaron, supra note 185, at 21-22.
194. A study of 149 police misconduct suits filed in federal court in Connecticut
concluded that the suits caused few changes in police department practices. Project,
Suing the Police, supra note 185, at 812-14.
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